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NGOs in Bangladesh are now caught up in a broader global discourse 
about the relationship between political systems, political culture and 
development. In earlier decades after liberation, NGOs operated within a 
normative assumption of secular democracy and a separation between civil 
society and state. This position was challenged by the realities of military 
governments between 1975 and 1990, and by problematic governance and 
corruption since 1991. However, within the context of global faith based 
movements, the centre of gravity political culture is now shifting to confront 
these secular and liberal assumptions. Bangladesh is now a vital site of 
contestation between the competing traditions of secularity and the 
‘ummah’, and thus between western (donor led) conceptions of a civil 
society and a more faith-based fundamentalist basis of political inclusion 
and incorporation. The Islamicisation of political culture is also generating a 
split within the NGO community. Some NGOs, with a previous secular 
perspective, have opted to avoid engagement by re-positioning their profile 
solely in terms of service delivery. Other, often more recent, NGOs promote 
‘Islamic values’ and are comfortable with their incorporation into a concept 
of ‘ummah’. However, there remains a significant third group of NGOs, with 
secular origins, which are trying to steer a complex course, pursuing secular 
democracy via a rights based agenda especially around women, yet 
differentiating themselves from the donor, western agenda. Thus they are 
embarked on a basic contestation over the meaning of nationalism in 
Bangladesh. 
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The larger NGOs in Bangladesh are now caught up in a broader global 
discourse about the relationship between political systems, political culture 
and development. In earlier decades since liberation, NGOs operated within 
a normative assumption of secular democracy and a separation between 
civil society and the state. Obviously this normative position was challenged 
by the realities of military governments between 1975 and 1990, and by the 
clear problems of problematic governance and corruption since 1991. 
Increasingly we can see a differentiation within the NGO community as 
positions are taken around the concern about ‘clash of civilisations’. While 
that thesis has pernicious overtones in over-privileging the connection 
between Christianity and secular rationality1, Huntington, along with Gellner, 
certainly focus attention upon the limits of western ideas about civil society 
when applied to Islamic political cultures.  
 
In an era of post/post-colonialism, ideas about non-alienating progress in 
terms of fulfilled livelihoods and wellbeing across the globe are increasingly 
contested and are  re-defining political cultures. The earlier, more 
immediately post-colonial, development decades offered a universal 
discourse dominated by, and ahistorically abstracted from, the experience of 
industrialised wealthy metropolitan democracies. A liberal democratic 
pluralist agenda was assumed as the universal vision for all societies, along 
with other accoutrements of modernisation. This is how the term 
'development' was conceived in the post-colonial era. A basic proposition for 
this paper is that the world has shifted into a post/post-colonial phase in 
which the structure of authentic knowledge about development has moved 
from a hierarchical, 'HQ' model to a globally re-distributed 'network' model 
with a multiplicity of sites of discourse credibility. This architectural shift is 
uneven, with erstwhile centres of power perhaps not even aware that their 
superiority is being successfully challenged by the movements of ideas in 
which economistic materialism no longer has a determinant monopoly over 
the idea of wellbeing2. In key ways, the modification of Western discourses 
about wellbeing and development through the embracing of 'human 
development' has opened up a Pandora's box of variables and indicators 
through which non-alienating progress needs to be understood. Thus the 
                                                 
1 See 'Clash of Civilisation, Clash of Barbarisms' (Wood 2006) 
2 The ESRC funded Wellbeing in Developing Countries (WeD) research programme, directed 
by Allister McGregor, at the University of Bath, is particularly focussed upon the social and 
cultural construction of wellbeing. The research is based on primary fieldwork in 4 countries: 
Thailand, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Peru. See http://www.welldev.org.uk/research 
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attempts to move away from economistic and materialist accounts of 
poverty have led us into a much more complex universe, indeed labyrinth, of 
claims for our attention. We have had dramatic recent illustrations of this 
seismic discourse shift in the Middle East, especially with the conflicts over 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and the continuation of struggles for the hearts and 
minds of the people of Iran and Pakistan. But the underlying process of 
such value contestation is more subtly observed in many parts of the world 
from Latin America to East Asia, including of course Bangladesh. 
 
Bangladesh has become a stage on which this value contestation is being 
played out locally through proxy players acting as both client agents of 
global principals, as well as being principals with principles of their own. The 
country is a particularly interesting case because it fought its own 
ideological battles for an ethnic based nationalism over a religious one 
throughout the period from Partition to Liberation. It then became a 
significant aid recipient after 1975 and thus the site of discourse 
experimentation as every minor shift in development fashions was piloted 
via the overpowering presence of donors. The period from liberation 
featured a dominant fact, matched by a dominant discourse: the state was 
in reality corrupt, incompetent and unaccountable; and the concept of state- 
led development was being powerfully critiqued by the neo-liberal 
arguments emanating from the West and the international agencies 
dominated by the West. However, the problem for the neo-liberal discourse 
in Bangladesh (as indeed elsewhere, especially in Africa) was that the 
market-led alternative was itself equally problematic in a society only just 
emerging from its agrarian, pre-capitalist or at least mercantilist legacy. At 
the same time, the period of liberation struggle had produced a generation 
of committed activists unwilling to be absorbed into the state, and not invited 
anyway, but equally unwilling to pursue individual fortunes via market 
entrepreneurialism under imperfect conditions. These combined conditions 
(i.e. donor aid, problematic state and market, a cohort of socially 
responsible activists and the increasing presence of donor aid) produced a 
unique conjuncture of opportunities in the emergence of: significant NGOs, 
extra-state development programmes, forms of subsidised market entry, 
and the slow emergence of a broader concept of civil society. But this 
conjuncture operated within a central frame of meaning about secular 
modernisation, and, given mass poverty, the empowerment of the poor as 
the key building block for democracy and more accountable government. 
For a couple of decades the development NGOs in Bangladesh dominated 
this conjuncture as the main post-colonial phenomenon. This position of 
collective NGO pre-eminence over the process of civil society has, over the 
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last decade, become challenged by other sets of values about wellbeing 
and human dignity as a feature of the post/post-colonial era. 
 
 
The Formation of NGOs in Bangladesh 
 
There are numerous versions of how development NGOs in Bangladesh 
rose to their position of civil society prominence in the period from liberation 
into the late 90s. It is unnecessary for the main purpose of this paper to offer 
a detailed overview of that process. Instead, I intend to provide a more 
skeletal account of the link between the emergence of key development 
NGOs and the 'aided' political economy during this period. As I write (early 
January 2007), Bangladesh is gearing itself for a key general election which 
will be an important test of the country's political culture, situated within the 
contemporary global clash of ideas and values. The electoral process and 
legitimisation of outcome could be tortuous, violent and chaotic. The 
immediate post-liberation period (72-75) was also chaotic, even despite the 
populist legacy of the victorious Awami League over the Punjabi military 
elite. The honeymoon period was shortlived for the Awami League 
government. In the absence of early, post-liberation aid (lessons here for 
Afghanistan and Iraq), the ruling group asserted monopoly positions over 
attempts to state manage the economy, and plundered without danger.3 The 
blatant 'winner takes all' behaviour under conditions of severely constrained 
resources alienated many other claimants in the society - not least the 
military. But other regional militias too were in quasi-open revolt, intensified 
after the 1974 famine and the defensive tactic of the Awami League 
leadership under Mujibur Rahman to form a one-party state (BAKSAL) to 
control an increasingly anarchic situation. The violent coup in August 1975 
was both a relief as well as an indictment of failure for many. Avoiding a 
detailed exposition of events (see Lifshultz, L. 1979 for that account), by 
November 1975 a clear military regime under General Zia Rahman had 
emerged, though with scores yet to settle. The military remained in power 
until December 1990 - the period in which development NGOs especially 
flourished. The relative absence of international official aid support during 
this immediate post-liberation period (72-75) was partially a function of 
successful disturbance of the international order by liberation forces and 
India (with the USSR in the background), and partially US sanctions against 
the use of PL 4804 to any regime exporting to Cuba (jute from Bangladesh, 
desperately short of foreign exchange). Thus any relief to the war torn 
                                                 
3 See Wood 1988  
4 Public Law 480 is a reference to food aid from the US Department of Agriculture. 
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country was mainly from the larger international charities such as OXFAM 
and War on Want, and the scale was hopelessly inadequate for the 
challenge of reconstruction. 
 
The urgency of relief, combined with a sole reliance upon the voluntary 
sector (domestically and internationally), brought together local liberation 
activists into the formation of local NGOs alongside the international ones. 
There were different routes to formation. The Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee (BRAC), founded in the first year of liberation, was 
essentially and initially a remittance operation from the Sylheti diaspora in 
the UK, focussing relief aid attention upon the Sylhet region in the North-
East, and upon the plight of women in particular. It soon attracted the 
support of both OXFAM and the Ford Foundation, and then other charitable 
and later official donors. The Canadian University Services Overseas 
(CUSO)5 set up a counterpart organisation in 1974 which quickly evolved 
into PROSHIKA-Dhaka and PROSHIKA-Comilla, with the former becoming 
the dominant after a few years. These PROSHIKAs then received technical 
support from CUSO and financial support from CIDA6 during its first decade. 
Many other NGOs followed suit, some with national ambitions, others 
content to remain local and regional. Some of the national ones were spin-
offs from international entities (such as CARITAS). Some remained 
international, with local offices like ActionAid and Diakonia. Some had 
strong Protestant, even evangelical, origins (such as Rural Development 
Support Services in the NW region of Dinajpur, Thakurgaon and Rangpur 
Districts). Some were international church charities working locally such as 
the Mennonites. Some were heavily sponsored by a single charitable donor, 
such as Samata in Serajganj District supported almost exclusively by 
OXFAM (see Devine 1999). Some, in the early 80s, followed BRAC and 
PROSHIKA in assembling a range of supporters, charitable at first then 
official, to pitch at national significance even if starting from a particular 
regional base - such as Gono Shajaho Sangstha (GSS), with initial support 
from OXFAM for its start up in Khulna. Another significant example has 
been Nijera Kori. Some were generalist in their poverty focus, others were 
sector-specific, concentrating on health or education or water or legal rights 
and so on. 
 
The point, though, is not to list or to over-classify. Depending on definitions, 
hundreds of NGOs emerged in the late 70s and through the 80s, registered 
under one Ministry or another. They also organised themselves into the 
                                                 
5 Resembling VSO in the UK 
6 Canadian International Development Agency 
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Association for Development Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB), in effect a 
club trying to police standards and act as a collective lobby. In the latter 
role, it became a player of variable significance in emerging civil society: 
variable on account of internal politics between NGOs as well as the 
external political conditions which fluctuated in stance towards NGOs and 
their donor supporters. Slightly to one side of these processes was the 
formation of the Grameen Bank, with its founder Director Md.Yunus just 
receiving a Nobel prize. Though eventually registered as a bank, in its early 
years it behaved in similar ways to many NGOs in forming small groups of 
poor men and women (significantly more women over time) to save and 
borrow collectively as well as engage in other collective action. The 
microcredit model to emerge from the Grameen Bank evolved into the 
microfinance model for the NGO sector as a whole, via large scale imitation. 
While microfinance has its limitations7, it has also been a major 
technological contribution globally to the relief (if not removal) of poverty. It 
has thus put Bangladesh, via its NGO movement, on the global 
development map. 
 
Although a rather uncomfortable fact for many NGO leaders and their 
senior/founder staff, the military regime period from 1975 to 1990 brought 
them to prominence as key national and international players. Military 
regimes, arising from coups, always have a problem of legitimation and 
constituency building, especially if they plan to become legitimate by 
metamorphasising into a political party. Since their oft stated initial mission 
was the 'clean up' of corrupt politicians, military leaders therefore have to 
find ways of by-passing the political elites they have just displaced (even if 
they are interrelated by kin and other networks). There appear to be two 
classic options, often combined: decentralisation; and alliance with NGOs, 
sometimes acting for the state under franchise. Both were pursued by 
Generals Zia (up to his assassination in 1981) and thereafter, Ershad. Both 
options limit the room for manoeuvre for potential opposition to the 
government, either by keeping it at arms length at the local government 
level (especially if political parties are banned from competing for local office 
under their own banners) or by rewarding cooperating NGOs with more 
freedom of action and less bureaucracy in accessing foreign aid. All of this 
happened in Bangladesh up to 1990, helping to explain why the NGO 
movement was so slow in joining the democratic forces against the waning 
military regime of Ershad. 
                                                 
7 See Wood and Sharif (eds) 1997; and Sharif and Wood (eds) 2001 
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The outcome of this pragmatic equation was a substantial expansion of 
NGO activity and a significant increase in direct donor support. For the main 
argument of this paper, there was an unstated secular consensus. Again 
without presenting elaborate history, Bangladesh had been suffering the 
classic conditions of underdevelopment both before 1947 and during the 
Pakistan era. Through its production of jute, it produced the bulk of foreign 
exchange for the combined wings of West and East Pakistan. However, the 
bulk of these export earnings were re-cycled into the development of West 
Pakistan and not re-vested at the point of production. The peasants of East 
Bengal were formally subsumed under capital (Brenner 1977), experiencing 
no change in their production relations while having the surplus value of 
their labour underwriting capitalist development elsewhere via fixed and low 
product prices. The liberation struggle was fought on these issues as well as 
the linguistic discrimination8 against the entry of Bengali middle classes into 
government, military and professional careers. The Awami League was 
successful precisely because it managed to combine both of these 
messages in mobilising a Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan. Given the 
stronger identity of West Pakistan and Urdu with Islam, the liberation 
struggle in East Pakistan was implicitly re-ordering the nationalist discourse, 
ranking the image of the Bengali small peasant (supported by an educated 
Bengali elite) higher than religious identity, indeed confining faith to the 
private domain. This was how the political principles of the newly formed 
Bangladesh were constructed. 
 
In political economy terms, however, there was considerable myth-making 
in this formula of the classless, small peasant society with common interests 
against the external oppressor. The agrarian production relations within 
Bangladesh also involved landlords, moneylenders, patrons, sharecroppers 
and other forms of tenancy, and significantly rising proportions of landless 
alongside smallholding peasants. Even during the Pakistan period, the 
dominant construction of rural development priorities was expressed 
through the image of the smallholding peasant, as in the Comilla 
programme. The post-liberation Awami League government, and the military 
ones which followed, invested further in this myth by spreading the 
principles of the Comilla pilot to the rest of Bangladesh as the Bangladesh 
Rural Development Programme (BRDP). However, even by 1978 from our 
research within the Ministry of Agriculture, the anecdotal understanding of 
growing landlessness was statistically re-affirmed from survey data. These 
                                                 
8 The combined government of Pakistan, seated in Islamabad, favoured Urdu as the national 
language. While Urdu was the second language of most in West Pakistan, it was hardly 
spoken or understood in East Pakistan. 
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indicated that while the rural population at that time comprised up to 80% of 
the country's population, 50% of these rural dwellers were effectively 
landless in having less than 0.5 acres, thus operating way below 
subsistence levels for an average nuclear family size of 5. The failure of the 
Comilla programme, and its government replication across the country, to 
recognise the extent of landlessness undermined its relevance to rural 
poverty reduction and the vulnerability of large swathes of the population to 
famine. This widespread vulnerability had been particularly revealed during 
the liberation struggle itself, but reinforced during the horrific famine of 
1974/5. There is little doubt, applying Sen's entitlement theory, that 
landlessness received a boost during the famine as families had to 
exchange long term assets like land for shorter term food supplies. 
 
It was this policy neglect of the central problem of landlessness which 
provided the entry point for the development NGOs and Grameen Bank. 
The 'poor' in the villages were targeted for NGO support on the grounds that 
their condition of poverty was the outcome of exploitation by other rural and 
urban classes. In that sense, the community, village-wide, solutions of the 
Comilla programme were considered as simply reinforcing the power and 
domination of the local patrons and landlords. Rather the NGOs followed 
Marxian inspired analysis of agrarian class relations in which the interests of 
the poor and landless were opposed to the community leaders. Thus the 
poor had to be organised into self-help groups in order to challenge other 
classes (e.g. over wages and land access) as well as provide collectively for 
themselves through joint productive projects, pooled liabilities for 
microcredit, and savings through which to mitigate collective and individual 
risk. Increasingly within this stance, the position of women came centre 
stage. Thus added to the critique of class inequality and the rejection of the 
'community of small peasants' myth, the patriarchal norms of the society 
came under fire. Both of these critiques (class and patriarchy) implicitly 
identified religious leaders locally and nationally as contributing to a 
conservative order which reproduced the poverty and exploitation of the 
poor, and among them women especially. Reflecting Freire's 'Pedagogy of 
the Oppressed' (1970) the common thread, in effect uniting different 
organisations into a movement, was empowerment. The seeds for later 







The Global Context: Combined and Exclusionary Growth 
 
The world has moved on since the late 70s and early 80s. Although in one 
sense globalisation is as old as mercantilism, and although the dependency 
and underdevelopment theorists offered us 'combined and uneven 
development', we are now in a new and dangerous era of combined and 
exclusionary growth both globally and reproduced within national political 
economies as well. This is a world-wide phenomenon of which Bangladesh, 
situated in South Asia, is a part. Thus since the end of the Cold War, we 
have been witnessing, with some exceptions9, a decade of growth albeit 
from a low base in some of the poorest areas of the world. In important 
respects this has been stimulated by export-oriented low wage economies, 
following the earlier paths of growth in Latin America and SE Asia from the 
late 70s (Gough, Wood et al 2004). But while countries in SE Asia have 
been relatively successful in spreading the income benefits of growth to 
keep absolute poverty low through their productivist welfare regimes (Wood 
and Gough 2006), this has not yet been evident in the poorer countries of 
Latin America, nor sub-Saharan Africa, nor swathes of the Indian sub-
continent, nor parts of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, nor crucial 
locations in the Middle East, nor in regions within China, as well as the 
Russian Federation.  
 
The concern for this paper is not to provide detailed evidence of these 
processes which are broadly familiar, but rather to investigate the 
implications of these for clashing values. Coinciding with the shift of 
emphasis from unevenness to the exclusionary characteristics of 
globalisation, and also as a function of it, there have also been significant 
discourse shifts in development fashions. The headline of discourse change 
in the Western approaches to 'development' has been towards a rights 
based agenda (Human Development Report 2000) - a more nuanced and 
complicated version of the empowerment and participation themes. This 
agenda explicitly accepts the paramountcy of the capitalist market and the 
inequalities and diversities of opportunities which arise from it. It thus argues 
that people have rights to be citizens with legitimate expectations to 
security, minimum basic needs and social protection, underpinned by the 
state. It is a Polanyian 'de-commodification' argument (Wood and Gough 
2006). 
                                                 
9 Until the last 3 years, Pakistan was experiencing stagnation in its economy. The aftermath 
of 9/11 has produced an aid dividend for Pakistan, along with ironically greater economic 
security inducing more inward investment, partly from the widely dispersed Diaspora through 
remittances. 
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How have these socio-economic changes played out in Bangladesh? Over 
the last two decades, the economic fortunes of the country have reflected 
wider globalisation, most notably in the garments industry in which a male 
management class employs and controls a large urban female workforce. 
While jute has faded in export significance, shrimps and leather also 
connect production relations to the world economy. Other sectors like coal 
and gas are rising. Importantly, these production relations and labour 
generally are now really (i.e. not just formally) subsumed under capital, in 
the sense that labour is commodified, but essentially without the regulative 
protection of the state. Other trade, aid and knowledge dimensions of 
globalisation have also stimulated a rapid process of urbanisation. Current 
World Bank projections to 2025 indicate that Bangladesh will be 60% urban 
at an overall population of approximately 260 million. This is a profound 
demographic transformation not only for livelihoods, but also for perceptions 
and psychological experience. The transformation of major cities already 
appears dramatic enough. Growing urban populations where the workforce 
cannot be absorbed into available employment opportunities. Poor people 
experiencing relative deprivation for the first time as they live and interact 
(e.g. through the provision of low paid domestic services) with more 
favoured classes. The expanding urban middle classes only serve as a 
reminder to those excluded from the globally stimulated opportunities 
rewarding education, skills and capital. 
 
This is a very different environment from even two decades ago when the 
NGO focus was upon agrarian inequality, and where the NGOs were the 
sole bearers of a vision to the villagers beyond localised patron-clientelism. 
These new urban classes are, of course, materially aspirant and seeking 
secure livelihoods like everyone else. They are also desperate to maintain 
their distinction from their dispossessed and humiliating rural origins as 
supplicants of landlords, moneylenders and employer-patrons. However, for 
increasing numbers, their urban experience comprises awful slums 
dominated by mastaans10 who mediate their access to employment, to small 
                                                 
10 The word 'Mastaan' refers to urban brokers and intermediaries, who act as 'mafia' patrons 
over the inhabitants of urban slums and more widely. They fix labour supply to the formal and 
informal sector, as well as basic needs in informal settlements where rights to residence, 
sanitation, electricity and other services are not legalised. They are seen as part of an 
oppressive criminal underworld, but they do provide protection and access (to services and 
employment) under conditions where the state and municipalities are highly corrupt and  thus 
not performing correlative duties to rights. With 'rurbanisation' these mastaan intermediaries 
also operate increasingly in the countryside, ousting the more familiar patron classes, which 
derived their power from landownership and culturally accepted seniority. This is a clear WeD 
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scale hawking and business opportunities, to living space in the slums, to 
essential services (sanitation, water, fuel, electricity connections), and to 
protection either from other mastaans or their colluding municipal 
authorities. Meanwhile such classes see continuous new construction of 
luxury apartments; a proliferation of shopping malls; new offices (often 
financial services); hotels, guest houses, restaurants and clubs; new cars 
(including 4x4s) and their glamorous occupants. 
 
This relatively recent experience of relative deprivation under conditions of 
combined but exclusionary growth is not just confined to the major urban 
centres. The new inequalities arising from a rapidly changing economy 
affected by globalisation penetrate into the countryside via complex patterns 
of migration and rurbanisation. In addition to the steady rural-urban 
migration there are many other patterns of cyclical and partial movements, 
which effectively connect parts of the rural population to the urban 
transformation. Migration is also international in a country heavily dependent 
for household livelihoods upon remittances from overseas, with workers 
experiencing the relative deprivation of growing economies in the Middle 
East and SE Asia, alongside the UK and elsewhere. This cognitive 
expansion is reinforced by developments in rural infrastructure, especially 
feeder roads to main highways bringing sub-district headquarters into easier 
linkages to regional and national centres. These administrative sites have 
also stimulated growth poles in terms of markets with commodities flowing 
in both directions. These processes of rurbanisation are also changing their 
hinterlands in terms of crop choices and economic activity, with increased 
levels of daily work migration. There is, therefore, a general increase in 
mobility, including for women. So the idea of the sedentary rural population 
waiting to be targeted by development NGOs, funded by foreign donors with 




The Millenarian Tendency 
 
The political consequences of globally combined and exclusionary growth 
have been revealing themselves strongly for more than a decade, and are 
intensifying. For some, the world changed on 9/11. But for many others 9/11 
concluded a phase, a decade and a half of re-alignment following the end of 
the Cold War era. With its dramatic symbolism, it brought post-modern 
                                                                                                                             
finding. In Bangladesh observers increasingly refer to the 'mastaani culture' as the dominant 
operational form of the society. (See also Khan 2000) 
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identity politics to the global political forefront as the main outcome of unfair 
globalisation. Although horrific in its personal consequences, alongside 
atrocities before it in East Africa, and subsequently in Bali and elsewhere, 
these events represent a clear message. The structural processes, which 
these 'terrorist' events have dramatised, comprise the post/post-colonial era 
in which the idea of capitalism with a human face, as the post Cold War 
dividend, gives way to widespread perceptions of inequality and injustice. 
 
It may legitimately be observed that inequality and injustice are not original 
to the post Cold War era, and of course they are not. It is the breadth and 
nature of the perceptions about inequality and injustice which have 
changed, along with the explanations offered for them. One could argue that 
the post Cold War dividend comprised an unlocking of globalisation from the 
geo-politics of superpowers and their respective client states, or client 
movements within states, such as Angola. The apparent triumph of neo-
liberalism released countries and classes from state socialist solutions to 
the inequalities of free market capitalism. But the poor and frustrated in 
those societies soon realised that their new found ideological and market 
freedoms simply took them into a new era of globalisation, unmediated by 
secure prospects of state-led decommodification and thus social protection. 
Such realisation was reinforced by the extension of structural adjustment 
polices from the World Bank and IMF into parts of the world not hitherto 
reached, now that Soviet protectionism had been withdrawn. Thus both the 
opportunities provided by globalisation and the opportunities to explain the 
unequal outcomes of globalisation have been 'liberated' in the last decade 
and a half. In a sense, there is no hiding place any more, no alibis for the 
proposition that untrammelled capitalism reproduces inequality and injustice 
if not regulated and modified by legitimate and popularly supported states. 
 
The sense of injustice about contemporary inequality is intensified from 
previous eras by literacy, mobility and migration, urbanisation and 
rurbanisation, wider media access and observational proximity to wealth 
and success. The cognitive experience of relative deprivation is a function of 
this exposure to other lifestyles, with which poorer people negatively 
compare their own. Such negative self-conceptions translate into feelings of 
inferiority, lack of self-respect, loss of dignity, shame and humiliation. The 
world is very familiar with this equation, say, in the context of Palestine and 
the Palestinians who have been confined by Israeli and US policy to the 
marginal zones of the West Bank and Gaza. However the argument here is 
that this equation is generic, and that it reproduces alienation and 
'millenarian' accounts of injustice which appear in different forms all over the 
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world. Although the term 'millenarian' has a stricter meaning about belief in 
the 'saviour' coming to solve current problems of poverty, deprivation and 
alienation, I am seeking to use the term to refer to wider socio-cultural 
processes, while not also losing aspects of the stricter meaning. 
 
Thus millenarianism is associated with cults, and therefore via shared 
perceptions of identity. It is associated with intense spiritual and 
metaphysical beliefs, and therefore in religious terms with more 
fundamentalist, fixed, literal or reductionist interpretations of scriptures as 
guides to human purpose, moral behaviour and wellbeing. To the extent that 
such beliefs constitute what Weber called 'value rationality', so believers are 
offered frames of meaning in which suffering and deprivation during life can 
be endured en route to the cure in the life hereafter. Endured in the sense of 
offering dignity in suffering by attributing the 'victim' condition to the 
exclusionary machinations and discrimination of others while acknowledging 
that such experience is only temporal and finite. In other words, 
powerlessness on earth will be compensated for by power, or at least 
reward, in heaven. This more passive version of millenarianism is to be 
found across the major religions e.g. caste and dwija11 in Hinduism; 
Pentecostal and other 'second coming' sects in Christianity in Latin America, 
sub-Saharan Africa and parts of East Asia, but also including the large 'born 
again' movements and cults in the USA; and the Wahhabi sect12 among the 
Sunni in Islam, as well as fervent Shia sects. 
 
Some of these have their more militant wings, which takes us in modern 
popular parlance from intense religious belief to what is usually mistakenly 
termed 'fundamentalism'. This is a confusion. Fundamentalism is a 
reference to absolutist forms of religious belief, and should be distinguished 
from militancy which operates more in the realm of identity politics, seeking 
to confront and punish the material oppressors on earth instead of just 
                                                 
11 'Dwija' means 'twice born': biologically and into one's caste position, with corresponding 
fate. 
12 The Arabian Wahhabis were and are followers of the puritanical reformed Islam first taught 
by Ibn al-Wahhab in Medina in the Eighteenth Century. In his 'The Last Mughal', Dalrymple 
(2006) discusses the leadership in Delhi of Shah Waliullah who studied in Medina at the 
same time as Ibn al-Wahhab. On returning to Delhi, Waliullah, with his sons, opposed the 
degenerate practices of Islam especially the Sufi and other syncretic traditions. Instead, he 
promoted a strictly Koranic monotheism, devoid of idol worship. 'Judging human reason to be 
incapable of reaching divine truth on its own, Shah Waliullah emphasised the importance of 
revealed divine revelation and urged a return to the text of the Koran and the Hadiths.' pp 76-
77. 
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relying upon 'being saved'. Indeed, for some militants, being militant is also 
a route to salvation - the 'Jihad' as proof of one's moral purpose on earth.13  
 
Taking this analysis and definitions into Bangladesh, what do we find? A 
society as a microcosm of these broader global tensions brought about by 
combined and exclusionary growth, and thus struggling with itself, its values 
clashing and increasingly difficult to reconcile within one overarching 
philosophy. The four principles of nationhood at liberation advanced by the 
victorious Awami League were: nationalism, secularism, socialism and 
democracy. The country has come along way from those principles, 
including some major deviations on the way. 'Socialism' has in effect been 
abandoned in the face of globalisation, reinforced by structural adjustment 
and aid conditionality14. Democracy was undermined early on by its original 
advocates15, with the military in direct control for 15 of the 34 years since 
liberation, and never far from the seat of power. Secularism as a 
distinguishing characteristic of 'Bengali' identity has been increasingly 
confronted by a nationalistic definition of being 'Bangladeshi', in which 
Islamic faith has been brought out of the private family sphere into the public 
ummah.16 Thus nationalism is increasingly associated with Islamic faith 
rather than secularism, with worrying implications for faith minorities. 
 
For me, it is no coincidence that these 'cultural and religious' rejections of 
the four founding principles of Bangladesh occurred within the context of the 
socio-economic equation noted above: a heightened sense of relative 
deprivation and consequent alienation arising from combined and 
exclusionary growth, assisted by the corollaries of urbanisation, migration 
and mobility. They have also been assisted by the weakening of the 
Western monopoly of external influence upon Bangladesh as 'Islamic' 
                                                 
13 Dalrymple's marvellous book also indicates the significance of Jihad in the mobilisation of 
sepoys against the British in 1857, with many Jihadis fighting against the British forces in the 
siege of Delhi, though ineffectively. 
14 Immediately after Liberation I was a tutor at IDS, Sussex to four senior officials of the 
Bangladesh government. One of them, the Additional Secretary Establishments Division - a 
key patronage post - and a brother-in-law to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was in effect the 
'thought police' of the group. When challenged about economic strategy, he would always 
recite: 'We aim to combine to the best of capitalism with the best of socialism.' So perhaps 
the socialist agenda was only ever rhetorical, for populist consumption. 
15 With the declaration of the one party state in January 1975, combining the Awami League 
with some other supporting movements into the acronym BAKSAL. This was a response to 
the increasing anarchy in the countryside. 
16 'Ummah': all embracing religious community, implying no separation between religion and 
politics. 
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sources of aid entered Bangladesh via the petrodollar bonanza17 from the 
late 70s. These sources, together with Diaspora remittances, have 
supported hospitals, clinics, educational foundations, orphanages and more 
recently madrassas.18 It has been interesting that these 'Islamic' sources of 
aid have by and large avoided the classic development sectors favoured by 
Western sources, such as agricultural development19, infrastructure and 
water management, gas and coal, and the more recent poverty-focussed 
livelihoods programmes (especially support for microfinance, but also 
training and employment generation) via NGOs and some government 
departments. With the current trend towards sector-wide programme aid, 
Western aid is supporting education and health sectors, thus turning these 
sectors into contested terrain - especially education. 
 
The millenarian tendency, using the broader definition offered above, has 
brought the Jamaat-e-Islami party into greater national prominence. While it 
has never been successful so far in mobilising popular votes20, it is alleged 
to be significantly influential in its coalition with the Bangladesh National 
Party (BNP), the governing party between 2001 and 2006. The BNP arose 
out of the attempts by General Zia Rahman to legitimate his presidency 
following his eventual victory in the coup sequence August-November 1975. 
The stance of the BNP has always been closer to the military establishment 
inherited from the Pakistan period21, and represents a more pro-Islamic 
definition of what it means to be Bangladeshi, in contrast to the more 
secular notion of Bengali. It is therefore highly susceptible to fundamentalist 
influence on its own political leadership. It has also been interesting to 
observe during the 2001-2006 period how senior civil servants, senior army 
officers, police and lawyers, as well as sections of the press have also been 
more vocal and explicit in their religiosity. Those 'signs' are everywhere in 
terms of dress, the conduct of meetings, the respect for prayer times as well 
as public pronouncements and international political allegiances. At the 
same time, when the Awami League was in office (1996-2001), it too had a 
'working relationship' with Jamaat-e-Islami, allowing its secularist policies to 
be moderated. In office, the Awami League had to tread a fine line between 
being accused of being pro-India (since its liberation victory was 
                                                 
17 An irony to reflect on. 
18 Madrassas are religious schools, focussed upon a rote learning of the Koran, but including 
other forms of Islamic socialisation. 
19 Though some IFAD support should be acknowledged. 
20 Though it certainly improved its position in the 2001 election. 
21 One of the reasons for its victory in 1975 was to re-assert the seniority 'queues' for 
promotion within the army, which had been overturned and politicised by the Mujib regime as 
rewards for loyalty to the Awami League and Liberation were handed out. 
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orchestrated by India in 1971), while not being captured by pro-Islamic 
symbolism and losing its secularist instincts. There is little doubt that the 
'fence' has now shifted significantly in favour of religious imagery for any 
party seeking national office. 
 
This trend has to be understood with subtlety. It would seem the world over 
that the more fundamentalist appearances of Islam occur within cities rather 
than the countryside - a social phenomenon of the lower middle classes, 
excluded from the cosmopolitan elites. With urbanisation and rurbanisation, 
as indicated above, we can thus expect these trends to grow, especially as 
any previous notion of a rural-urban divide is now certainly blurred through 
mobility and migration. At the same time, with the expansion of the middle 
classes, especially concentrated in the major cities, we observe livelihoods 
progress via the coat tails of globalisation and a corresponding desire to 
combine investment in English speaking education for one's children 
alongside current ostentatious consumption22. Are these consuming new 
middle classes secularists cum lapsed Muslims and Bengali in identity, or 
do they actually represent a more subtle blend of Islamic consumers, careful 
to define boundaries between halal and haram23, as in the economically 
dynamic Gulf States? These consumers are not abandoning faith, and they 
are not (mainly) abandoning senses of moral virtue. Of course compromises 
are made, especially with the richer younger generation. But, for example, 
even within these privileged circles, love marriages still have to be approved 
and sanctified in traditional ways. There is not an appetite for any excessive 
rejection of faith. There is an appetite for seeking to apply faith based moral 
principles to the conduct of the state and operation of the market, and a 
desire for politics generally to be less corrupt as the way to support 
business and reward entrepreneurial initiative. In a sense the clash of 
values is partly between the nouveau riche of the business community who 
are maintaining faith alongside investment and consumption, and the more 
long term established middle classes from among the educated 
intelligentsia in the Universities, among the Press, some lawyers, some civil 
servants, in the think tanks and consultancy groups, and among the NGOs. 
 
There is a further aspect to the need for subtlety in understanding. It is 
simply not possible in Bangladesh, and perhaps elsewhere in the sub-
continent too, to classify occupational sectors among the middle class as 
                                                 
22 The list is as above: luxury apartments, new cars and 4x4s, the latest electronic goods, 
fashionable clothing, smart restaurants and international travel. 
23 These dual opposites of pollution categories (halal-acceptable, haram-unacceptable) are 
familiar in many cultures and in Hinduism would be understood as pucca/kacha. 
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faith based or secular, hence the words 'among' and 'some' above. While 
there may be some broad distinction between business and the professions 
that works in terms of religiosity, there can be no watertight categories. 
There are crosscutting identities in two senses: sectors employing people 
with contrasting values, and kin groups straddling both sectors and values. 
It is these crosscutting ties which have held the society together at the top 
so far, with pluralism outweighing socially closed identity groups. Large kin 
groups can contain within them a wide portfolio of contrasting, sometimes 
opposing, occupations and stances. So radical secular NGO leaders can be 
closely related to senior army personnel, and periodically rely upon them to 
get themselves out of trouble. Likewise with civil servants, kinship 
connections can be used across the 'values divide' to delay investigations, 
prosecutions, implementation of judicial or executive decisions. It is also the 
case that an NGO, like PROSHIKA, may have a strong secularist stance, 
reflecting both its mission and leadership, while employing more faith-based 
employees throughout the organisation. In other words, actors in this 
political culture are juggling incommensurate sets of values and making 
compromises with themselves and others all the time. That is the oil of an 
otherwise fractious society. 
 
Nevertheless, even with this caveat, the battle lines within Bangladesh are 
being drawn more sharply in a manner reflecting those globally. Global 
value clashes are intensifying, in part as a function of the awareness of 
combined and exclusionary growth, but also stimulated by the 
fundamentalist rhetoric coming from the White House and Whitehall and 
translated into failures in Palestine, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan24. These 
global events do appear to be re-shaping political culture within Bangladesh 
and some of the development NGOs are in the forefront of contestation 
between secularism and fundamentalism, with the moderate Islamic middle 
ground squeezed out, perhaps along with other forms of indigenous social 
capital (Mesbahuddhin, 2007). Certainly there is an increasing popular 
discourse about the 'talibanisation' of Bangladesh. Furthermore, recent 
attacks upon the more secular actors within the political class, including 
successful assassinations and near misses of prominent political leaders in 
the Awami League, have allegedly been carried out by extremist, militant 
                                                 
24 And Bangladesh is not alone in internalising the global environment, or clash of barbarisms 
(Wood 2006, Feb). Witness the violent clashes in France between the authorities and ethnic 
minorities, and the ongoing ethnic tensions in the UK. We can look elsewhere in Africa too, 
such as Somalia. 
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groups25 citing Islamic protest and jihad as their justification. These have 
included suicide bombings. The ruling BNP government has been slow to 
distance itself from these groups, and is certainly accused of being 
insufficiently proactive in pursuit of these killers26 During the same period, 
and especially since the formation of the BNP government in 2001, there 
have been a series of legislative attempts and executive orders (based on 
pre-existing legislation about the registration status of NGOs and their 
regulated functions) intent upon setting tighter controls over development 
NGO access to foreign funding and the uses to which it is put. The NGOs, 
which have been most affected by this closer attention (some would say 
harassment), are in little doubt that the Jamaat-e-Islami influences in the 
governing coalition are responsible. They perceive a direct attack upon their 
secular mission, a mission, they would argue, which derives from the four 
founding principles of the Bangladeshi state. This is a good point to leave 
discussion of the millenarian tendency and consider the discourse within 
which some of the major development NGOs in Bangladesh have operated. 
 
 
The Secular Origins of Civil Society  
 
As noted in an earlier section, it is necessary to appreciate the origins of 
these major development NGOs. Some emerged from the relief and 
reconstruction environment of liberation. Other leaders, in addition, had 
direct involvement in the liberation struggle itself via underground guerrilla 
activity following a student career of demonstrations in the language 
movements. They believed in the four founding principles of the Bangladesh 
state, while seeking to distance themselves from the widespread corruption 
which rapidly engulfed the new political leadership. The discourse of 
liberation was akin to the later Sen notion of 'development as freedom', and 
was certainly strongly influenced by Paulo Freire's 'Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed' (1970) which presaged both the development as freedom and 
the capability philosophies. One cannot under-estimate the impact of the 
Latin American liberation theology of the late 60s and 70s upon the 
emergence of the NGO movement in Bangladesh from the mid-70s. It 
                                                 
25 Two groups advocating violent opposition to the secular liberal tradition are the Jagrata 
Muslim Janata and the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen. The International Crisis Group (ICG) has 
linked these organisations to an upsurge in terrorist violence during 2005. 
26 The ICG report (The Guardian 9.01.07) warned: 'The issues of foreign funding of 
extremism and the growing madrassa system are concerns for the longer 
term…circumstantial evidence, as well as cold political logic, suggests underground terrorist 
groups have been cultivated and sheltered by those in power.' 
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offered a human development approach to the confrontation with hostile 
political economies27. It put empowerment and participation on the agenda, 
again a long time before Western development philosophers caught up28. 
The NGO missions were defined in these terms: mobilising the disorganised 
poor to have collective effect upon their oppressors, while also doing 
collective things for themselves. It was the practical embodiment of 
'structuration', even before Giddens had formulated it. It preceded Long's 
'actor-oriented epistemology' (Long 1992). This was a ground breaking, 
paradigmatic shift. A direct challenge to the top-down, technocratic 
approaches of agricultural extension before Chambers, before 'Putting the 
Last First' (Chambers 1983), and before the  'Farmer First' discussions 
(Scoones and Thompson 1994)29. 
 
What was the analysis, which underpinned these NGO origins? The Awami 
League won its 60s battles with the Punjab bureaucratic-military elite on the 
myth of an homogenous smallholding peasantry, bound together by Bengali 
identity and Muslim brotherhood - in that order. But that was a myth. Even 
though post-partition East Bengal did not have the extreme agrarian 
structures of West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh in neighbouring North India 
and the provinces of West Pakistan, there was significant inequality and 
class differentiation based upon landowning and landholding, as well as 
controls over agricultural inputs, services, subsidies and markets. The early 
post-liberation research led by myself in the densely populated Comilla belt, 
east of Dhaka, revealed significant inequalities even within minifundist land 
settlement where a large landholding was 5 acres30. The Land Occupancy 
Survey of 1977 revealed for the first time the extent of landlessness, nation-
wide. Although there were regional variations (Wood 1981), the countryside 
was dominated by a petty landlord class from the old toujidars31, controlling 
                                                 
27 Again, an approach which preceded its adoption by UNDP and the series of Human 
Development Reports over a decade later. 
28 I recall debating empowerment ideas in the context of Marxian revolutionary positions with 
PROSHIKA colleagues from 1975 onwards. The examples of the Naxalites and the CPI(M) in 
West Bengal were uppermost in our minds, and the CPI(M) dominated the Left Front 
government in West Bengal from 1977 to present day. 
29 I am certain that leading colleagues in Bangladesh have been major development 
innovators over the last 3 decades, as illustrated in the recent Nobel Peace prize for 
Prof.Md.Yunus, founder of the Grameen Bank. Other leaders have also received 
international prizes and honours. 
30 See A. Huq (Ed) Exploitation and the Rural Poor, Bard, Comilla, 1976 & 1978. But also 
Wood (1994). 
31 'Toujidars': a landlord class in Bengal, as part of sub-infeudation of tax farming in the 
zamindari system. The toujidar classes in Bangladesh were especially dominant in the North 
and Western regions of the country at the time of independence from the British Empire, and 
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sharecropping tenants, employing direct rural labour and doubling up as 
moneylenders. These classes came from the upper lineages (bangsho) and 
dominated local institutions at the village and sub-district levels (i.e. 
shalish/informal courts, elected local government positions, contract 
opportunities, and access to common land, water and orchard/forest). The 
tenants and labouring classes of both sexes were desperately poor, 
insecure and vulnerable to the slightest risk either from within the household 
(e.g. death of a productive member, or ill-health, or a dowry obligation) or 
from the local environment (e.g. floods and droughts). In these relationships, 
the poor were clients of patrons, tied by multi-stranded transactions. Their 
security was highly dependent (Wood 2001 and 2003). And as clients, they 
were disorganised against themselves - in the Marxian lexicon, they were a 
class in themselves but not for themselves32. With the state in the hands of 
the narrow, educated, professional elites, and the business classes yet to 
emerge, a class based struggle on behalf of the poor had to involve some 
critical stance towards the state. The early NGOs such as PROSHIKA and 
Nijera Kori, but also including the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC) which now has a more apolitical, service orientation, all 
shared this political economy analysis. 
 
Obviously a key aspect of this analysis of agrarian inequality was the 
powerlessness of these client classes, in two dimensions. First the class 
basis of exclusion from education with widespread illiteracy as a result. On 
the eve of liberation, East Bengal has to be understood as an elite-mass 
society: the masses were illiterate. The scale and significance of this 
illiteracy cannot be under-estimated. In legal terms it meant either complete 
exclusion from any legal redress, or excessive reliance upon local literates 
who were more likely to side with, or be bribed by, the landlord opposition 
(e.g. in land grab cases), or most likely dependence upon the local shalish 
in which support would only come from one's own patron if in opposition to 
another faction leader. It meant being unable to enter into any written 
contract with any confidence. It meant being reliant upon others to be aware 
of payment and work conditions (e.g. in locally administered public 
works/employment/relief schemes), (Wood 1985). The early NGOs 
addressed the problem of literacy head-on through functional literacy 
                                                                                                                             
retained a position as landlords with tenants and sharecroppers, as well as employers and 
moenylenders. The term is fading as the agrarian structure re-configures. 
32 I shall always remember listening to a brilliant analysis of local patron-client exploitation 
from a poor tenant in a village near Comilla in 1974, but my informant had never travelled 
more than 8 miles in his 35 years, and had little knowledge that there were millions of clients 
like himself across the country. 
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programmes, again taking their cue from Freire. Functional literacy became 
a euphemism for broader teaching about the inequalities of the political 
economy, and the need for the poor to mobilise and be organised33. 
 
The second aspect of powerlessness was gender. In many ways, BRAC 
was onto this dimension of powerlessness from the outset, with its initial 
relief focus upon women in Sylhet. But it was also clear as Grameen Bank 
got underway that the highest proportion of its borrowers were women. 
PROSHIKA and Nijera Kori had a more inclusive class analysis, in which 
other inequalities (gender, ethnicity, even literacy) took second place. 
However, gender soon became prominent for them also. Thus women's 
groups alongside men's groups were organised, alongside mixed groups (in 
which men inevitably dominated). Programmes of functional literacy for 
women, which also embraced family planning issues, were therefore also 
adopted by these NGOs. All these dimensions of inequality (and of course 
including the ethnic based inequalities for the Hindu and tribal minorities) 
involved a critique of the local alliances between religious figures and the 
landlord interests. It also entailed a critique of the conservative mullahs who 
were resistant to the mobility or autonomy of women and any tendencies 
towards their empowerment (later on this included resistance to girls' 
education in non-formal primary education). Indeed, it was the gender issue, 
and the related microcredit interventions34, which became a central 
confrontation between these secular NGOs (with a 'feminist' dimension - 
especially urged upon them by the external feminist representatives of 
donor aid) and the ummah, and especially the more fundamentalist wing of 
the ummah. 
 
This is how the analysis of powerlessness in the agrarian political economy 
and the secular issue become intertwined. To the extent that the religious 
institutions and leaders were propping up the established order, as they had 
done in Ireland, in many parts of Europe, and in Latin America35, so were 
they seen as a drag upon progress, upon 'development'. But the secular 
stance goes beyond this and connects, as suggested above, with the four 
liberation principles. Thus the emphasis in these principles was upon the 
                                                 
33 I was personally involved in sharing my agrarian political economy analysis with colleagues 
in both BRAC and PROSHIKA, and also less directly with some other early NGOs too. 
'Exploitation and the Rural Poor' (Huq Ed, 1976 and 1978) was also widely read (hence 
going to second print after 2 years). 
34 with interest, and also directed at women 
35 Precisely giving rise to liberation theology in Latin America among the younger priesthood, 
daily exposed to the injustices meted out by the established order upon their poor 
parishioners. 
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specificity of being Bengali, whether Muslim, Hindu, Christian or tribal. 
PROSHIKA has most obviously stayed very loyal to this principle and is very 
explicit in this aspect of its mission. Some observers would argue that this 
clear stance is partly the cause of its harassment at the hands of the BNP 
led government since 2001. However, PROSHIKA has not been alone. 
Before GSS was dissolved36, it also had a strong secular stance, led by a 
classic leader from the literati, pre-business, establishment. Likewise, Nijera 
Kori and many regional NGOs within the Association of Development 
Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB). BRAC held this stance, especially in the 
practice of its large-scale non-formal primary education programme. Indeed 
in the late 90s, it was the BRAC schools which were being burnt down by 
fundamentalist militants, though it was PROSHIKA rather than BRAC which 
chose to organise large-scale demonstrations in protest over these 
attacks37. The BRAC leadership preferred to defend itself through quieter 
diplomacy. 
 
It is important to appreciate the symbolism of liberation in political and 
populist terms. We have a good test of this by comparing the 1991-1996 
period of the first BNP led government with the 1996-2001 Awami League 
government, and again thereafter. During the military regimes and the first 
BNP government, there were few pictures of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 
public places, including offices and school classrooms. The liberation 
discourse was marginalised from the language of government. If any 
memory was to be institutionalised, then Begum Zia as Prime Minister was 
concerned to justify the actions of her late husband General Zia Rahman, 
who had emerged victorious from the coup sequence of August-November 
1975, and ruled (sometimes viciously38) until his assassination in 1981. To 
justify her husband, the liberation discourse had to be downplayed to the 
point of almost being forgotten. This was quickly reversed after the Awami 
League's victory in 1996. The pictures, posters and placards of Sheikh 
                                                 
36 Gono Shahajo Sangstha had many problems from the mid/late 90s in terms of 
management and donor funding, so its secular position was part of a wider problematic 
picture. It may yet revive as an organisation, having completed a number of court cases over 
registration status, mission and management. 
37 There was a significant incident in the 90s in the eastern district of Brahmanbaria, in which 
pitch battles were fought between PROSHIKA led protesters and Islamic activists. 
38 He actually authorised the bombing and strafing of the Bogra cantonment soon after taking 
control in order to put down or intimidate into submission the biplopi (revolutionary) forces. 
These were supporters of Colonel Abu Taher, the military hero of Liberation in Bangladesh 
and who had deployed his supporters to free General Zia from brief incarceration after the 
first coup in August 1975 and thus ensured his victory in November 1975. Zia subsequently 
hanged Taher. (See Lifschultz, 1979). 
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Mujib appeared everywhere. In the press, the discourse was back - though 
notably softer on both secularism and socialism. Some accommodation with 
Jamaat-e-Islami was found, and the neo-liberal structuring of the economy 
could no longer be reversed: for example the public distribution of 
agricultural inputs through the Bangladesh Agricultural Development 
Corporation (BADC) had long been displaced by privatisation and market 
outlets. But liberation was clearly re-visited and the Bangladeshi-Bengali 
issue re-awakened. Deals with the old Awami League ally (i.e. India) were 
quickly done over the controversial and long standing disputes over 
managing the lower Ganges waters, thus cementing the Bengali affinity in 
the region. The slow but steady trickle of out-migrations of Hindus across 
into West Bengal or Assam slowed down. The minorities felt more secure. 
 
A critical aspect of this symbolism resided in the materials for functional 
literacy training as well as the popular theatre performances across the 
villages. Here PROSHIKA and GSS had much in common but other NGOs 
also followed suit. Although these materials and performances had not been 
dormant during the military and BNP periods, popular theatre certainly re-
emerged strongly when the Awami League gained office. Given the 
continuing widespread illiteracy across Bangladesh, popular theatre troupes 
passing through the villages have always the traditional form of cultural 
bridging between elite and mass. NGOs adopted this cultural medium, 
adding key political, socio-economic and cultural messages to the drama. 
The scripts, costumes and exaggerated performances are not very subtle as 
mullahs are ridiculed for their fundamentalism, landlords and the military for 
their collaboration with Pakistan and Islamic/Urdu impositions, officials for 
their aid corruption, and politicians, moneylenders and local contractors for 
their exploitation of local labour. Excessive patriarchy is also sent up. It is all 
caricature. For those who have never witnessed one of these performances, 
they resemble an English pantomime. There is a stage. There is lighting. 
They are staged in the open air, at night, to large audiences cross-legged 
on the hard baked mud of a courtyard, surrounded by stalls selling snacks 
and trinkets. The audience is lively. There is much laughter but also identity 
with the storyline and characters and so moments of intense and serious 
engagement with much nodding at recognised themes. A further step in 
these performances is when some of the local audience have been selected 
earlier in the day to play minor roles. As they ham it up, so their friends and 
kin urge them on with clapping and cheers. The liberation principles define 
good and evil and wrong-doers always end the evening shamed and 
humiliated as the secular heroes deliver the final speeches and the political 
messages are driven home. Of course, in a village nothing is secret. So 
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while these performances may be staged in the poorer paras39 of the 
village, the 'spies' are everywhere both in the audience and sometimes 
rather obviously standing at the edges. Typically the sons of landlords and 
contractors will be identifiable by their cleaner clothes, shoes, wrist watches 
and hair cuts, and by their demeanour - glowering. 
 
I have dwelt upon this description at some length, trying to 'bring it to life' in 
the imagination of the reader, because these are frontline representations of 
the secular-religious divide, the political loyalties, the form of nationalist 
identity, the clash of values. The re-invigoration of the liberation discourse 
during the 1996-2001 period and the accompanying confidence of the 
secular-radical movements to deploy the 'safe' liberation discourse for a 
renewed mobilisation around the inequities of the political economy, which 
were by now significantly urban as well as rural, sharpened the terms of 
potential conflict. When the BNP-Jamaat coalition regained power in 2001, 
scores were to be settled and the fulcrum of political discourse re-located as 
the discourse was again marginalised. However, this was not just tit for tat 
factional oscillation. Structural changes, globally and nationally, continued 
through these periods of government - in other words combined and 
exclusionary growth had deepened, producing not only new global 
reference points but also heightened senses of relative deprivation among 
the dispossessed urban lower middle classes. The global reference points 
have been increasingly but erroneously represented as a clash of 
civilisations (Wood 2006), but certainly reproduced internally as a tussle 
between versions of civil society, jointly despairing of state failure but having 
contrasting recipes for improvement. 
 
Thus Bangladesh, interestingly, represents a vital site of contestation 
between the competing traditions of secularity and the ummah, and thus 
between western (donor led) conceptions of civil society with a rights based 
agenda and a more faith-based fundamentalist basis of political inclusion 
and incorporation. Some NGOs, with a previously secular perspective in 
Bangladesh, have opted to avoid engagement with this dilemma by re-
positioning their profile solely in terms of service delivery and choosing not 
to guide any empowerment outcomes from such service delivery. In the 
context of increasing violence from militant Islamic groups, these NGOs are 
keeping their heads well below the parapet.  Other, often more recent, 
                                                 
39 'Para' is a distinct residential location within a village, often able to trace several 
generations of genealogical descent. They are likely to have their own patrons drawn from 
the stronger lineages, and perhaps their own mosque too. They are similar as a notion to 
mohallah in Pakistan. 
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NGOs have been formed with a much clearer ‘Islamic values’ purpose from 
the outset and are comfortable with their incorporation into a concept of 
ummah. However, there remains a significant sub-set of NGOs, with secular 
origins, which are trying to steer a complex course. On the one hand, they 
are determined to pursue the normative assumptions of secular democracy 
by advancing a rights based agenda, with the issue of women strongly in 
their discourse. This rights agenda refers to essential ‘liberal’ principles of 
the autonomy of the individual, and directly addresses issues of governance 
and corruption. At the same time, these same NGOs are trying to avoid the 
tag of being anti-nationalist and the accusation of aping the donor, western 
agenda. Thus they are also embarked upon a basic struggle and 
contestation over the meaning of nationalism in Bangladesh. 
 
 
Dilemmas for Civil Society 
 
There is clearly a risk in writing just before the 2007 election, to be 
conducted in an environment of intense procedural distrust, nation-wide 
strikes and hartals40 and rising political violence. At this point several 
outcomes are possible. The elections will be further postponed due to these 
conditions, with a state of emergency declared, backed by the military. Or 
they are held but the outcome so heavily contested with accusations of foul 
play (more likely if the BNP coalition wins again at the expense of the 
Awami League led opposition) that resulting instability will require military 
intervention. Or the Awami League will actually win but bring down more 
violent militancy upon its head and will find it enormously difficult to hold 
onto power41. Under any of these conditions, the challenges to the idea of 
civil society promoting the interests of a mass underclass are immense. The 
society is at a crossroads. Will it retain a political culture based upon secular 
democracy and a separation between civil society and the state, albeit 
heavily eroded by successive military governments and pervasive problems 
of corruption and poor governance? Or, within the context of global and 
domestic faith-based movements, will the political culture of Bangladesh 
evolve in ways which confront the normative assumptions of secular 
democracy and state-civil society separation? Will the Islamicisation of 
political culture, now evident within the country, re-order the discourse about 
                                                 
40 'Hartal' is a standard instrument of widespread public protest in Bangladesh, involving the 
shutting of shops and attempts to close other services. They are often achieved through 
intimidation by organised elements of the political party or movement calling for the action. 
41 While writing, the first of these options has occurred. The situation is unfolding and for the 
moment revolves around preparing a more up to date voters list. 
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civil society and the role of NGOs towards the notion of the all-embracing 
ummah, or community? 
 
The latter of these options is a complex proposition. The 'western' reaction 
to the problematic state in terms of legitimacy, corruption and poor 
governance is to promote the idea of a strongly independent civil society, 
represented by organisations with their various respective constituencies. 
These engage in advocacy and lobbying to improve the functioning of the 
state, with the implied threat that if governing elites do not improve they will 
never attract or retain the loyalty of constituents who will end up creating 
alternative movements and oust those elites from power. Recognising that 
that can be a long process, organisations within civil society also actually 
perform service functions for those they represent, as well as encouraging 
forms of organised collective behaviour so that poor and vulnerable people 
can help themselves while states and markets fail them. Within these 
notions of improving the functioning of the state there is clearly a rights 
based agenda which entails a broader notion of citizenship both in terms of 
entitlements and expectations of protection and service, as well as the 
capabilities and agency to ensure that the correlative duties of the state are 
performed. Capabilities and agency are required for people to help 
themselves too: individually in the market or through collective action. This 
is the agenda which the western donor community supports in Bangladesh 
through its aid priorities. It is a stance derived from the European 
Enlightenment and western political philosophy. Even when the state is 
functioning reasonably well, this philosophy holds that vigilance is always 
required via the organisations of civil society to ensure standards of 
acceptable governance, protection and service. To do that job well these 
organisations always need to be independent of the state - hence the 
principle of separation. This is the account of liberal, secular, democratic 
political culture. This is also a notion of 'gesellschaft', of organisations or 
associations deliberately created for a purpose, and deliberately and 
voluntarily joined. The plurality of these organisations in a society keeps the 
exclusive demands of each other in check. 
 
It is this version of political culture, which is under threat in Bangladesh. The 
threat is also a reflection of contestation globally between the merits of 
secular democracy and theocracy as systems of government. Widespread 
corruption and poor governance is seen by some faiths as a failure of the 
liberal democratic path, which therefore needs to be replaced. Liberal 
democracy over-privileges individuality and self-interest. It appeals to venal 
instincts and encourages corruption and personal acquisition. Such 
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individualism is immoral and favours the already advantaged. These failures 
are excluding the faithful poor and thus breaking up the superior notion of 
community or 'gemeinschaft', in which people are members through birth 
and belief. Thus faith is public not private and should guide political 
behaviour and social capital. Thus the state and any other organisations in 
the society, including market ones, cannot be distinguished as having 
different moralities checking the potential excesses of each other. With the 
pre-eminence of faith, theocracy is the logical form of rule since the leaders 
of the faith are by definition trustworthy. This is the ummah conception of 
political culture, in which the idea of separate civil society is nonsensical. 
This was the origin of Gellner's critique.  
 
Mesbahuddin (2007) argues that something of value is being squeezed out 
and lost in this stark contrast between western liberal democracy and 
Islamic ideas of ummah. In other words, is it possible in Islamic societies to 
conceive of Islamic civil society? Such a proposition would mark out an 
educated, moderate Muslim middle class, prepared to honour their faith 
privately and be guided by it in their personal behaviour, but keen to accept 
the principles of democracy and pluralist institutions keeping each other in 
check rather than relying upon a theocracy42. In so behaving, they would be 
distinguishing themselves from Wahhabi millenarianism and accepting that 
human agency in the material world can change fortunes and improve 
livelihoods. They would be fighting for inclusion for themselves and poorer 
others, and they would be deploying religious identity inclusively rather than 
as an instrument of social closure and exclusion. Because they were not 
claiming public universalism for their faith, others outside the faith would not 
automatically be dispossessed of citizenship. That would be an important 
contrast with the fundamentalist agenda. 
 
How should we map these dilemmas for civil society onto the stances of the 
NGOs in Bangladesh? The problems of choice for NGOs with a rights 
based, western stance are compounded by the issues of nationalism and 
sovereignty, as they are being re-defined by these processes of 
Islamicisation. In other words, it is not a straightforward contrast between 
                                                 
42 Perhaps an approximation of this process has been Ireland, where the rule of the clerics 
has faded without the populace losing its faith and personal worship. The regionally 
concentrated born again communities of middle America also operate in the space between 
strong, fundamentalist faith, guided by evangelical leaders, but remaining, at least so far, 
citizens in a liberal democracy - thus being part of civil society. The Pentecostal movements 
in Latin America are in a similar position in the sense of being separate from the state rather 
then intent on merging with it. 
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secularism and faith based movements. There is also a further complicating 
dimension: the rights of 'beneficiaries' in relation to the NGOs which operate 
in their areas and dominate some of their options and opportunities through 
services and microfinance, in return for some evidence of loyalty. We too 
easily forget that the clients of NGOs are supposed to be independent 
citizens with the freedom to be serviced by a plurality of agencies across the 
state-NGO divide, as well as to have their own values and the freedom to 
express them. Thus NGO leaderships and their staff may be secular, for 
example, while their beneficiaries or followers are also being courted by the 
local mullahs and the agents of political parties, as well as other NGOs, 
bearing gifts and incentives. Thus NGOs on a continuum of stances across 
the secular/fundamentalist divide end up having a composite profile which 
reflects a combination of levels: the international discourse about civil 
society in the context of global categories, the national political culture and 
the various local political cultures. 
 
A single NGO may not be exactly the same at each of these levels because 
their stance is affected by the conditions and required compromises and 
negotiations at each of these levels. Obviously too great a dissonance of 
stance between these levels would reveal an NGO as hypocritical and 
untrustworthy - so there has to be a degree of consistency. But it has 
always been clear in Bangladesh that an NGO may be strongly secular and 
rights based at the national level (and seeking donor endorsement and 
funds thereby), while having to do 'deals' at the local level, and having to 
moderate its objectives (Devine 1999). These deals have involved local 
mullahs, landlords and mastaans along with the agents of political parties, 
local officials and contractors. And according to location, the local deals are 
not the same. Perhaps more compromises with Islamic sensibilities in the 
more conservative areas, especially in the Eastern and North Eastern parts 
of the country. These compromises might be fewer female teachers in the 
non-formal primary schools; or at least accepting more constraints upon 
their modesty and mobility. It might be a less aggressive programme of 
labour rights for women in the local rural works programmes. It might be a 
modification of interest rates on loans. It might be that women can only meet 
behind closed doors rather than in open spaces. It might be accepting that 
locally mobilised groups cannot be mixed gender. It might be conceding the 
claim of the local mosque to khas43 land and water resources. It might be 
accepting that local mastaans, contractors and officials will have to enjoy 
some rent at the expense of local labour, thus limiting their employment 
                                                 
43 Untitled land arising from intestate wills, or government under-utilisation, or disputed land 
arising from migrations since Partition. 
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rights. The realities of local power have always circumscribed the rhetoric of 
NGOs at the national level. It is also the case that NGOs vary in the 
compromises they are prepared to make at the national level, with some of 
them making continuous incremental adjustments to the shifts of political 
culture in the context of Islamicisation while others have more determinedly 
defined their line in the sand nationally while making tactical deals locally. 
 
 
Conclusion: the Shifting Rights Agenda 
 
By recognising these complexities, we can understand that we are not 
looking at a situation of simple opposites as in the formulation: secularism or 
fundamentalism. At the same time, it is convenient for manoeuvring 
protagonists to mutually label and 'other' in this way (Wood 2007b), and this 
is becoming the mode of contestation in Bangladesh. This construction of 
each other is not only a recruiting device, it is a move into a subtle form of 
identity politics which is cutting across the original class analysis of the 
Marxian political economy as applied to Bangladesh and even more 
dangerously at the global level too. This means that the rights agenda itself 
is being re-formulated away from class and vertical inequality notions 
towards horizontal inequality notions. From a Marxian perspective, the 
danger lies in dividing the poor among themselves along variables which 
are less significant to the explanation of material poverty and more to do 
with broader, less material and more spiritual notions of identity, dignity, 
avoidance of alienation and conceptions of wellbeing44. 
 
This shift in the rights discourse has wider implications. It takes the notion of 
empowerment, the early mantra of development NGOs in Bangladesh, 
inspired by Freire, into different territory. Empowerment becomes more 
expressed in terms of faith identity as a deliberate challenge to the class 
and secular notions of empowerment arising from the inequality discourses 
of the West. I have argued earlier that, in my judgement, this is a function of 
global combined and exclusionary growth in contrast to the more familiar 
Marxian proposition of combined and unequal growth. There are further, 
theoretical as well as nationalist implications of this trend. 
 
Theoretically, if empowerment is being re-defined, then so too are broader 
notions of human development and indeed wellbeing and a western 
                                                 
44 See the publications arising from the UK-ESRC funded Wellbeing in Developing Countries 
(WeD) research programme in the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at the 
University of Bath. 
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discourse about agency. This is complex to summarise. The western 
discourse about development shifted from the orthodox development 
accounting of the World Bank and friends in terms of material indicators of 
poverty which were deployed to rank comparatively the development status 
of different countries. This shift was expressed in the thinking of the Human 
Development Reports arising from the UNDP since 1990. These reports 
introduced process and input indicators, requiring an underlying approach to 
human agency as the principal vehicle of change. This paradigm shift in 
measuring development and forming a more nuanced view about poverty 
and wellbeing drew upon three intellectual traditions: the structuration of 
Giddens; the capabilities of Sen; and the positive understanding of 
citizenship advanced by Rawls. Each of these themes argued normatively 
for the rights of human agents to engage with and transform determining 
structures whether embodied in the state or the market. Each was 
concerned about how to bring those rights about. Each therefore converged 
upon the formula of 'development as freedom', although this phrase was 
specifically popularised by Sen. The principles of agency derived from these 
three traditions found their way into the Human Development Indicators, via 
the pioneering transformative and applied thinking of the late Mahbubul 
Huq. Implicit within these indicators were concerns about the quality of life 
and wellbeing (and for me that includes a preoccupation with alienation), as 
well as, towards the later 90s, security (Wood 2007a). Two dimensions of 
freedom emerged: human development as freedom to, and human 
development as freedom from (i.e. from political oppression and economic 
powerlessness, via social protection). 
 
It is this discourse which is now being challenged by fundamentalist 
millenarianism and the politics of identity at national levels, like in 
Bangladesh, and globally. Agency, capabilities and citizenship are all re-
defined within an embracing notion of faith and ummah. In a 'consensual' 
theocracy, what is there to struggle against? In what sense does one part of 
society need to regulate the behaviour of another part of society when 
separation between public and private, between the moralities of state and 
market cannot be conceived? What is there to lobby for in a civil society 
process when all are part of the same gemeinschaft? Thus the concept of 
rights can only be applied at a level of conflict between believers and non-
believers, rather than between believers. 
 
It is in this sense that a basic clash of values about principles and rights 
increasingly prevails in societies like Bangladesh. Part of the respective 
political missions within the country is to harness and capture the emotive 
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discourse of nationalism to one's own version of human development and 
wellbeing. It is in this way that the western discourse about rights in 
Bangladesh is more easily wrong-footed precisely because it is external, 
and derived from 'othered' intellectual traditions. And it is in this sense that 
the four principles of liberation are under severe threat as the defining 
variables of Bengali nationalism in Islamic Bangladesh. Those NGOs 
espousing the western rights and human development agenda are thus 
manoeuvred into being treacherous, anti-nationalists. They are increasingly 
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